US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs, Books, and Publications
7-1-2005

Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for
"Democratic Security"
Thomas A. Marks Dr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
Marks, Thomas A. Dr., "Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for "Democratic Security""
(2005). Monographs, Books, and Publications. 738.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/738

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs, Books, and Publications by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

SUSTAINABILITY OF COLOMBIAN MILITARY/STRATEGIC
SUPPORT FOR “DEMOCRATIC SECURITY”

Thomas A. Marks

July 2005

Visit our website for other free publication downloads
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi
To rate this publication click here.

*****
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not
necessarily reﬂect the ofﬁcial policy or position of the Department of the Army, the
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public
release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded
to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave,
Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.
*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI
Homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report also may be
ordered from our Homepage. SSI’s Homepage address is: http://www.carlisle.army.
mil/ssi/
*****
The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update
the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and
forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute.
Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research
analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on our
homepage at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/newsletter.cfm.

ISBN 1-58487-212-8
ii

FOREWORD
A sea-change has occurred in troubled Colombia, as detailed in
this monograph. For the ﬁrst time in 40 years, cautious optimism
pervades discussions of Bogota’s seemingly intractable situation.
Drugs, terrorism, and insurgency continue in their explosive mix,
but the current government of President Alvaro Uribe has fashioned
a counterinsurgency approach that holds the strategic initiative and
has a chance of negating a long-standing security threat to the state.
This is critical if Colombian democratic and economic advances
are to continue. Colombia has become synonymous in the popular
mind with an intractable war waged against narco-terrorists. Not
as understood is the strategic setting, wherein the illegal drug trade
is not just linked to terrorism but rather is an integral part of a leftwing insurgency that continues to talk the language of the Cold War.
This insurgency is the greatest threat to Bogota and to Washington’s
interests in the region.
Thus it is of particular moment to see an indigenously generated
response succeed in turning the tide. What has been particularly
remarkable has been a military reform movement engineered by
Colombian ofﬁcers committed to strengthening military professionalism and accountability to civilian authority.
Washington has played a crucial but supporting role in the process,
working closely with what many are beginning to call a model in
dealing with the complexities of state integration, development, and
internal security. Built upon the common sense notion that none of
these are possible without personal security, there is much that bears
examination in the Colombian approach.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Upon taking ofﬁce in August 2002, President Alvaro Uribe Velez
of Colombia was faced with a difﬁcult strategic situation that required
a fresh approach. This was forthcoming in a Democratic Security and
Defence Policy which radically reoriented the state posture towards
its principal security challenge―an insurgency inextricably linked to
the narcotics trade and other criminal activity. Previously committed
to negotiation, the government opted for counterinsurgency. Though
multifaceted in its dimensions, the new policy effectively assigned
the cutting edge role to the Colombian armed forces (COLMIL), most
prominently the dominant service, the army (COLAR). This required
that the forces aggressively pursue a well-funded, entrenched
adversary within a complex international environment decidedly
hostile to state efforts at stability operations. This they have done in
impressive fashion.
These same armed forces had already set the stage for the shift
in policy by pursuing a reform movement that had allowed them to
wage more aggressive operations, while the previous administration
of President Andres Pastrana (1998-2002) had unsuccessfully sought
a negotiated settlement with the main insurgent group, Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC), and to a lesser extent with the distant second
group, Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, or National Liberation Army
(ELN). The self-defense groups of the Autodefensas Unida Colombia,
or United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC), the so-called
“paramilitaries,” were a symptom as opposed to a cause and did
not threaten the government through insurgent activity. Continued
combat was necessary, because neither FARC nor ELN altered their
military posture during negotiations. To the contrary, FARC used
Bogota’s provision of what was to be demilitarized space, the Zona de
Despeje, to facilitate an intensiﬁcation of the conﬂict through the use
of main force warfare, while terror and guerrilla action continued.
Thus Colombia’s counterinsurgency approach under President
Uribe built upon a foundation already put in place by the armed
forces, a foundation upon which a national as opposed to a virtually
stand-alone armed forces campaign could be constructed. This has
v

resulted in a level of state commitment, led by continuous military
operations. The insurgents thus far have been unable to counter
strategically.
Bogota’s strategy recognized the need to dominate local areas by
providing a security umbrella under which the normal functions of
the state could be exercised. The operational vehicle for carrying out
the effort was to place a “grid” over the target area, with speciﬁc
forces carrying out speciﬁc missions, all coordinated in such manner
as to stiﬂe insurgent activity. The basis for all else was the deployment
of local forces. These Soldatos de mi Pueblo (“Home Guards”) were
indispensable to establishing state presence in affected areas. Local
forces had all the more impact, because the police, using the same
approach, systematically established presence in every municipio
(county) in the country.
Military-police integration highlights the increasingly joint nature
of Colombian operations. Though answering to a Commanding
General (CG) Joint Command, the military services themselves had
functioned together more as a matter of courtesy than command.
This had not posed any insuperable problems, particularly given
COLAR’s dominance, but it was not the ideal way to conduct
counterinsurgency, where unity of command was crucial. Plans to
implement military “joint operational commands” in place of the
exclusively COLAR divisional areas were tabled in Summer 2004―
and met with ﬁerce resistance in parochial circles―but had the support
of President Uribe and began to be implemented in December 2004.
It is planned that the individual services will become more “service
providers” in the U.S. sense, while CG Joint Command will exercise
operational control of forces that resemble U.S. combatant commands.
Such a development is entirely logical in waging counterinsurgency,
but is a sea-change in the way Colombian services have functioned
throughout their history.
Integration extends beyond the military. The involvement of
the state has brought a new closeness to working relationships that
hitherto normally depended upon interpersonal relations in areas of
operation. In particular, law enforcement and judicial authorities have
become an important part of operations. This provides government
forces with enhanced ﬂexibility, because the police and ofﬁcials are
able to engage in actions not legally devolved to the armed forces.
vi

In the ﬁeld, the strategic initiative has inevitably featured tactical
setbacks. The insurgents, as with government forces, have a learning
curve and have sought to exploit the very weaknesses created by
the government’s success and a zero-defects political mentality.
As military action has forced the insurgents to break up into small
units, the security forces have done likewise. This, however, creates
opportunities for medium-size insurgent concentrations to surprise
isolated or tactically sloppy units with rapid concentrations which
then disperse. The insurgents appear to recognize the pressure for
“no bad news” placed upon the military by the political structure
and thus have moved adroitly to exploit it.
Regardless of substantial progress, the single 4-year,
constitutionally mandated presidential term is not enough time to
negate the tactical ability of FARC to initiate guerrilla and terror
actions. The large number of mine casualties among the security
forces, for instance, has little to do with anything save FARC’s
extensive use of the internationally banned weapons systems.
Likewise, pushing ever deeper into previously denied areas can only
expose troops still further to such dangers―even as the dismantling
of the counterstate so laboriously built over the past 40-some years
steadily diminishes FARC’s ability to launch actions of signiﬁcance
by ending its apparatus for pushing through serious warmaking
supplies to its units.
Faced with this profound threat to its viability as an insurgent
movement, FARC must respond. As a consequence, there should be
no doubt that “violence” in Colombia will continue indeﬁnitely. Yet
the counter by the state lies in precisely what is being done: creating
a situation where the response is both “correct” and sustainable.
The Uribe approach is certainly “correct” in the manner in which it
conceptualizes the problem and seeks to respond to it; it is sustainable
in its present form, because it demands no unacceptable investments
of resources, human or material. It will face adjustments if the U.S.
contribution ends, but it is unlikely this will happen for some time.
The result, then, is likely to be a Colombia more integrated than at
any time in its history, economically and democratically sound, and
safer than it has been in 4 decades.
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SUSTAINABILITY OF COLOMBIAN MILITARY/STRATEGIC
SUPPORT FOR “DEMOCRATIC SECURITY”
Upon taking ofﬁce in August 2002, President Alvaro Uribe
Velez of Colombia was faced with a difﬁcult strategic situation that
required a fresh approach.1 This was forthcoming in a Democratic
Security and Defence Policy,2 which radically reoriented the state
posture towards its principal security challenge―an insurgency
inextricably linked to the narcotics trade and other criminal activity.
Previously committed to negotiation, the government opted for
counterinsurgency. Though multifaceted in its dimensions, the new
policy effectively assigned the cutting edge role to the Colombian
armed forces (COLMIL), most prominently the dominant service, the
army (COLAR). This required that the forces aggressively pursue a
well-funded, entrenched adversary within a complex international
environment decidedly hostile to state efforts at stability operations.
This they have done in impressive fashion.3
These same armed forces had already set the stage for the shift
in policy by pursuing a reform movement4 that allowed them to
wage more aggressive operations. The previous administration of
President Andres Pastrana (1998-2002) unsuccessfully had sought
a negotiated settlement with the main insurgent group, Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC (Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia), and to a lesser extent with the distant second
group, Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, or ELN (National Liberation
Army). The self-defense groups of the AUC (Autodefensas Unida
Colombia, or United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia), the so-called
“paramilitaries,” were a symptom, as opposed to a cause, and did
not threaten the government through insurgent activity. Continued
combat was necessary, because neither FARC nor ELN altered their
military posture during negotiations. To the contrary, FARC used
Bogota’s provision of what was to be demilitarized space, the Zona
de Despeje (or Area de Distension), to facilitate an intensiﬁcation of
the conﬂict through the use of main force warfare, while terror and
guerrilla action continued.
Thus Colombia’s counterinsurgency approach under President
Uribe built upon a foundation already put in place by the armed
1

forces, a foundation upon which a national, as opposed to a virtually
stand-alone armed forces campaign, could be constructed. In its
planning and implementation, the campaign has been so impressive
that it currently is being viewed as a model for other countries
facing similar but certainly less intractable, complex challenges.
Sustainability necessarily has been a central issue for Bogota, to the
extent that calculations of funding and force levels were worked out
in some detail even prior to assumption of ofﬁce. This has resulted
in a level of state commitment, led by continuous military operations.
The insurgents thus far have been unable to counter strategically.
SITUATION PRIOR TO ELECTION OF URIBE
Lack of government leadership during the Pastrana years had left
security matters to the military―army (Ejerctio Nacional, but COLAR);
navy (Armada Nacional, or ARC), of which the marines, Brigada Fluvial
(River Brigade), were a part; and air force (Fuerza Aerea Colombiana, or
FAC). The state, in other words, did not engage in counterinsurgency.
This meant annual military plans, while they included a basic civic
action component, were necessarily incomplete.5 That this did not
prove disastrous stemmed from the nature of the major security
threat, FARC (ELN was essentially a law and order concern; the
AUC essentially a product of the need for local protection where the
state was absent).
Committed ideologically to Marxist-Leninism, FARC had drifted
increasingly to a vaguely deﬁned “Bolivarian” populism that had
little appeal in Colombia. Polls consistently found the movement
with minimal popular support or even sympathy. Its efforts at armed
propaganda had fallen off to nothing after a mid-1980s high, and it
was increasingly corrupted by reliance for funding upon criminal
activity―drugs, kidnapping, and extortion (in that order, perhaps
$250 million in total).6 Consequently, its approach to insurgency,
modeled after “people’s war” doctrine of the Vietnamese variant
as ﬁltered through, in particular, the FMLN (Frente Faribundo Marti
de Liberacion Nacional, or Faribundo Marti Liberation Front) of El
Salvador, had become a perversion of the original and had more in
common with focismo than armed political action built upon mass
mobilization.7
2

FARC’s reliance upon the normal apparatus necessary to support
armed campaigning, base areas, and mobility corridors, resulted in
a dual center of gravity vulnerable to Colombian military attack:
the insurgent units themselves and their sources of sustenance.8
Allowing for the low numbers organized in a nationwide support
base (frequently inspired by terror), the armed units comprised the
movement.
This had been recognized by the new military leadership that
emerged following Pastrana’s inauguration. They had crafted their
approach based upon the neutralization of FARC’s strategy, even
as they instituted a far-reaching and comprehensive military reform
process that affected everything from recruiting (a largely draftee
COLAR became one-third volunteer, with key units essentially
100 percent “professionals”), to military schooling, to assignment
policies, to structure, to operational art. The result was a reclaiming
of the strategic initiative by the Uribe advent.
Military reform was central to all that occurred during the
Pastrana years. A combination of internal dislocation caused by
the growing drug trade, U.S. efforts to “punish” Colombia during
the Samper administration (1994-98) for inadequate “cooperation”
in counternarcotics (CN) efforts, and mediocre senior military
leadership; all had combined to cripple what had been known as a
sound armed forces. Reform, primarily a COLAR project, touched
upon virtually every aspect of the institution but focused in particular
upon revitalizing the military education system, absorbing lessons
learned through operational and organizational modiﬁcations, and
developing sound noncommissioned ofﬁcer (NCO) leadership to
enhance small unit performance. Simultaneously, greater attention
was paid to human rights instruction, information warfare, and joint
and special operations.
The profound institutional and strategic shifts outlined above
occurred as, in the aftermath of “9-11,” the United States altered
the approach of the Clinton years and dropped the artiﬁcial barrier
which had separated CN from counterinsurgency (COIN). This was
critical because during the Clinton administrations (1992-2000), the
war had been divided artiﬁcially as a consequence of the demands of
American domestic politics. The U.S. contribution to Plan Colombia,
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a multifaceted effort to identify Colombia’s critical areas for action
to facilitate societal revitalization, was structured wholly to support
CN.
Of greater consequence than lost assets was the intense U.S.
pressure upon the Colombians for battleﬁeld fragmentation and
distortion. Committed to assistance in the only fashion politically
viable―in an America forced to focus upon the supply side of its
own drug problem―U.S. ofﬁcials, forces, and individuals tended
to embrace the ﬂawed logic that Colombia’s problem was one of
narcotics, with the security battle a consequence. Insurgent reality
was stood on its head. American urgings that Colombian armed
action focus upon a narcotics center of gravity were rejected by
the military leadership (apparently, often in conﬂict with Pastrana
ofﬁcials). As a consequence, the U.S. role during this period, as far
as Colombian military leadership was concerned, was appreciated
but not directed at the real issue, counterinsurgency. The target of
the internal war, in COLMIL’s estimation, had to be the population,
95-96 percent of which lived outside the drug-producing zones of the
llanos, or eastern savannah.
Ironically, even the drop in the “bar,” between CN and what
came to be labeled counterterrorism (CT) assistance did not change
fundamentally the U.S. orientation. U.S. funding, though impressive
in raw ﬁgures―at one point Colombia was third in foreign aid behind
only Israel and Egypt―was still overwhelmingly committed to a CN
campaign driven by its own internal measures (most prominently,
hectares of narcotics ﬁelds neutralized). Further clouding the picture,
periodicals-of-record in the United States tended to lump overall U.S.
aid ﬁgures into “support for the Colombian military,” thus reviving
a Vietnam era stereotype of hapless Army of the Republic of Vietnam
(ARVN) held together by American money and “advisors.”9 Nothing
could have been further from reality.
Colombia’s armed forces were quite on their own in both their
operations and their reform movement, which was driven wholly by
Colombian personalities. The basic military framework for waging
counterinsurgency was created by the geographical assignment of
the 5 COLAR divisions (18 x brigades) and a Joint Task Force, with
a division-strength national reaction force in reserve.10 Of its 145,000
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men, COLAR had some 20,000 in volunteer, counterguerrilla units,
organic to its brigades and divisions. The warﬁghting army, then,
was 47 counterguerrilla battalions (batallones contraguerrillas, or BCG)
and 3 mobile brigades (brigades moviles, or BRIM, each comprised of
4 x BCG), a total of approximately 59 BCG.11
The regular formations that comprised the rest of COLAR were
overwhelmingly draftees. Domination of local areas was the lynchpin
of the counterinsurgent effort, and a variety of imaginative solutions
were tried to maintain state presence in affected areas. Essentially,
the draftee regular units were used to engage in area domination
and conduct local operations; the BCG and BRIM to strike at targets
of opportunity. Speciﬁc missions that required speciﬁc skills, such
as guarding critical infrastructure or operating in urban areas, were
carried out by dedicated assets, as were special operations.
But in the absence of local forces, which had fallen afoul of
constitutional court restrictions and thus disbanded, it was difﬁcult
to consolidate gains. As areas were retaken, they could not be
garrisoned with home guards. Instead, regular units rotated in and
out, a perpetual shell game designed to keep FARC off balance (to a
lesser extent ELN; only FARC operated as main forces).
Further complicating the situation, a legal framework that did
not respond to the needs of internal war meant all such action was
carried out under the provisions of peacetime civilian law. Under
Pastrana, no emergency or anti/counterterrorist legislation of any
sort was passed. This placed individuals in what were at time
absurd situations, particularly since the police generally were not
available to accompany operations, being preoccupied with their
own efforts to survive (numerous times, for instance, towns and
their police garrisons found themselves attacked by FARC forces
using homemade but nonetheless potent armor).
Faced with such an array of challenges, it was a credit to the
power of the military reform movement and the improvements
made by its leadership in strategy, operational art, and tactics
that the strategic initiative had been regained by mid-2002. This
occurred because the reform movement in the dominant service,
COLAR, was driven by personalities who, beyond their military
knowledge, evinced an understanding of both counterinsurgency
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and Colombia’s unique circumstances. They were able, despite the
lack of strategic involvement by the state, to arrest the negative
trends that had emerged with growing force even during the Samper
administration.
Most importantly, the reform leadership defeated FARC’s
attempt to transition to main force warfare (i.e., mobile or maneuver
warfare; Stage II in the people’s war framework). Using the Zona as
the staging ground for attacks by “strategic columns” comprised of
multiple battalion-strength units, FARC found itself bested by CG IV
Division, Major General Carlos Alberto Ospina Ovalle, who worked
intimately with his superior, CG COLAR (Comandante del Ejercito),
General Jorge Enrique Mora Rangel, and CG Joint Command
(Comando General de las Fuerzes Militares12), General Fernando Tapias
Stahelin.
This trio dominated operational planning throughout the Pastrana
years, with Mora eventually taking the place of Tapias (upon his
retirement). Ospina, after CG IV Division, became, ﬁrst, COLAR
Director of Operations under Mora; then Inspector General (IG) Joint
Command under Tapias, who used the IG principally as a combat
inspectorate; and, ﬁnally, CG COLAR (with General rank) when
Mora moved up upon Uribe’s inauguration. When Mora himself
retired in November 2003, Ospina became CG Joint Command.
What these ofﬁcers shared was a correct understanding of
Colombia’s war and a well-developed approach to institutional
transformation and operational art. Mora and Ospina were
noteworthy for their close working relationship and the esteem
with which they were held throughout not only COLAR, but the
armed forces. Both had proved themselves tactically time and again
as they had advanced through the junior ranks, then operationally
as more senior commanders. Ospina, an ofﬁcer of considerable ﬁeld
experience and attainment, was regarded as COLAR’s “brain trust,”
with a deep knowledge of insurgency and counterinsurgency.
Together, working under Tapias, Mora and Ospina fashioned
highly effective COLAR annual campaign plans which, as they were
instituted, forced FARC onto the defensive. Their correct appreciation
of the situation, though, could not be translated into a true national
counterinsurgency until the election of Uribe.

6

URIBE’S DEMOCRATIC SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY
A third party candidate who won an unprecedented ﬁrst round
victory in May 2002 (he took ofﬁce in August), Uribe introduced a
dynamic style to security affairs that prominently included producing,
early in his administration and with U.S. encouragement, a national
plan. Unlike the predecessor Plan Colombia of the Pastrana/Clinton
years (written with U.S. input), which had been a virtual catalogue
of national ills with proposed solutions beyond Bogota’s ability to
operationalize or fund, the new Democratic Security and Defence Policy
(ofﬁcially released in June 2003) was intended as a course of action.
As such, it was built upon three basic tenets:
• A lack of personal security is at the roots of Colombia’s social,
economic, and political ills.
• This lack of personal security stems from the absence of the
state in large swaths of the national territory.
• Therefore, all elements of national power need to be directed
towards ending this lack of national integration.
Addressing this assessment was the policy itself, its thrust stated
directly:
Security is not regarded primarily as the security of the State, nor as the
security of the citizen without the assistance of the State. Rather, it is the
protection of the citizen and democracy by the State with the solidarity
and co-operation of the whole of society . . . This is, in short, a policy for
the protection of the population.13

Threatening citizens and the stability of the country, stated the
policy, was an explosive combination of: “terrorism; the illegal drugs
trade; illicit ﬁnance; trafﬁc of arms, ammunition, and explosives;
kidnapping and extortion; and homicide.”14 The hitherto intractable
nature of Colombia’s security conundrum stemmed from the
interlocking nature of these threats.
It was this dynamic at which Uribe’s plan was aimed. If one
course of action stands out as central to the whole, it is “consolidating
control of national territory,” the indispensable element of any
counterinsurgency. A “cycle of recovery” is detailed that evokes
7

images of the approach used in successful counterinsurgencies such
as those of Thailand, the Philippines, or Peru.15 It further outlines
precisely the strategic approach to be used:16
• “The Government will gradually restore state presence and
the authority of state institutions, starting in strategically
important areas.”
• “Once the Armed Forces and the National Police have
reestablished control over an area, units comprising
professional soldiers, campesino soldiers [i.e., local forces] and
National Police carabineros [police ﬁeld force] will maintain
security and protect the civilian population. This will enable
state organizations and criminal investigation authorities to
work in the area.”
•

“Once a basic level of security has been established, the
State will embark upon a policy of territorial consolidation,
reestablishing the normal operation of the justice system,
strengthening local democracy, meeting the most urgent needs
of the population, broadening state services and initiating
medium to long term projects aimed at creating sustainable
development.”

Necessarily, since what is under consideration is a strategic plan
for waging internal war against a hydra-headed threat, the security
forces undertake the most prominent and difﬁcult tasks. Though
responsibilities are outlined for all state bodies, the security forces
are to provide the shield behind which restoration of legitimate
government writ takes place.
Under the Ministry of Defence (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, or
MDN17), the security forces prepared their own plans to implement
the Democratic Security and Defence Policy. Both the military’s Joint
Command and the CNP were subordinate to MDN and used as their
guide the strategic document drawn up by Defence Minister Marta
Lucia Ramirez de Rincon and her staff after consideration of the Uribe
policy―their product was issued as a 4-year vision applicable to the
entire Uribe presidency.18 COLAR’s objectives were for all practical
purposes those of the Joint Command.19
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The central elements remained “protection of the population”
and “elimination of the illegal drugs trade in Colombia,”20 to be
accomplished through the application of national will, resources, and
power. As the premier element of national power in the internal war
at hand, therefore, the military clariﬁed its role further in a “general
military strategy” issued by CG Joint Command General Mora. This
has remained the key document for the application of military action
to support the president’s “democratic security” counterinsurgency
approach.
OPERATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS AND POLICY
With the framework established, there remained implementation.
In this, the military was far ahead of other elements of the state since
it had already gone through dramatic change during the Pastrana
administration. So far-reaching were the military reforms that, in
many respects, the armed forces presented Uribe with a new tool upon
taking ofﬁce.21 Key had been continuity of exceptional leadership able
to implement, under difﬁcult operational and material conditions, a
reorientation of the military’s warﬁghting posture.
Central to this reorientation was the inculcation within the
ofﬁcer corps of greater professional knowledge concerning not only
the operational and tactical mechanics of internal war, but strategic
knowledge of insurgent approaches and aims. Here Mora’s faith in
Ospina’s knowledge of counterinsurgency paid off. For Ospina was
adamant that seeing the insurgents as merely narcotics trafﬁckers
or criminals or terrorists obscured the deadly symbiosis that drove
the movement. Whatever it engaged in tactically, whether terror
or the drug trade, FARC continued to see itself as a revolutionary
movement and sought to implement people’s war as its operational
form, to include focusing upon the rural areas to surround the urban
areas. ELN, as already noted, had deteriorated to the point of being
a threat to public order as opposed to national security.
The AUC was nearly equal in combatant numbers to FARC, but
very different in ideology and combat doctrine. It was an umbrella
organization of most independent vigilante groups that had become
one of the leading perpetrators of violence, on a par with FARC. The
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AUC had gained its potent combatant numbers by mobilizing the
demand for security that exploded in the “unincorporated” rural
areas ravaged by FARC (and, to a lesser extent, ELN). It funded
itself through donations but also, eventually more prominently,
by exploiting the drug trade (just as did FARC and ELN). It was a
primary contributor to internal violence because it ruthlessly attacked
FARC’s support base. Efforts to portray the AUC as but an extension
of the narcotics trade or as a stalking horse for the military quite
missed the interactive dynamic at work.22 Uribe’s plan was aimed at
this dynamic.
Hence, as concerned the security forces, the threat to be
countered had remained relatively constant in nature, regardless
of increasing insurgent (especially FARC) involvement in the drug
trade and other criminal activity. The insurgents sought to dominate
local areas, eliminating through terror those who persisted in their
opposition. Guerrilla action targeted the police and smaller military
units, with task-organized columns (columnas) appearing as main
forces whenever a target invited. Other elements of the people’s war
approach―mass line, united front, political warfare, and international
action23―remained anemic to the point of irrelevance, leaving the
military threat the issue.
As noted previously, when Uribe took ofﬁce, the military had
already spent nearly 4 years developing a correct approach to its
own facets of counterinsurgency. The strategy recognized the need to
dominate local areas by providing a security umbrella under which the
normal functions of the state could be exercised. The operational vehicle
for carrying out the effort was to place a “grid” over the target area,
with speciﬁc forces carrying out speciﬁc missions, all coordinated in
such manner as to stiﬂe insurgent activity.24 The problem was that
there had not been enough units or enough funding.25
Counterinsurgency is manpower and resource intensive. Uribe
sought to provide both of these with a military leadership that was
already out of the starting gate. Not only was the general funding
level provided to the military raised; but, in a dramatic gesture of
commitment, the president asked Congress to levy a one-time “war
tax” for a substantial expansion of actual forces, primarily COLAR
(which in mid-2004 reached a strength of some 202,000). This brought
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in approximately $670 million, which was allocated to Plan de Choque
2002-2006 (“Plan Shock”), a phased scheme to substantially increase
the specialized COLAR forces needed to make the “grid” viable.26
Units of all types were integrated into the force structure according
to plans pre-dating Uribe but now funded: new BCG and BRIM,
with every division being given its own organic BRIM (IV Division
received two; there are a total of 12―with three more planned―up
from the previous three) and others going to the general reserve
(if all formations are considered, there are now 78 x BCG, up from
the Pastrana total of 59); urban special forces (joining “rural special
forces,” the traditional mode of operation); special transportation
network protection units (Plan Meteoro, or “Plan Meteor”); high
mountain battalions speciﬁcally situated and equipped to block
insurgent mobility corridors through hitherto inaccessible heights;
strengthened infrastructure protection units (PEEV, from Plan
Energetico y Vial); and local forces to provide security, in particular,
for rural urban centers. Simultaneously, from the same funding
source, enhancement of individual effectiveness was to be improved
by converting draftee slots to volunteers at the rate of 10,000 per
year―an expensive undertaking, since it cost approximately ten
times for a volunteer as for a draftee.
All components related to each other. Standing up of local
forces platoons, for instance, though intended initially as a step
to enhance security of the population, was soon found to produce
greatly enhanced information ﬂow to the forces and thus served
as the basis for more accurate and intense employment of regular
and strike units. Greater activity in an area forced the insurgents
to move, especially the leadership, presenting targets for enhanced
special operations capability. Loss of leaders led to surrenders,
which allowed psychological warfare units to exploit defections with
a variety of innovative programs, from rallies to radio broadcast.
Fewer insurgents meant greater freedom of movement, and
special units secured the transportation arteries just as they did the
critical infrastructure. Business picked up; the economy improved;
kidnappings and murders dropped substantially.27
If there was one element in the “grid” that provided the missing
link, it was the deployment of local forces. These were indispensable
to establishing state presence in affected areas and neatly sidestepped
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legal objections (and ﬁerce opposition from international human
rights organizations) by utilizing a 1940s era law, discovered still
on the books, which allowed a portion of the national draft levy to
opt for service in their home towns―in local defense units. Initially
called Soldados Campesinos (“Peasant Soldiers”), a name the troops
themselves disliked―Colombia, despite its substantial agricultural
sector, is classiﬁed as approximately three-quarters urban, and the
units were universally located in rural towns. Hence, Soldados de mi
Pueblo (“Home Guards” would be the most useful rendering) came
to be used simultaneously.
Constituted as platoons assigned as part of the complement
of the appropriate nearby regular battalion; trained, armed, and
equipped as regular soldiers; ofﬁcered by regulars; and ﬁelded
systematically according to Plan de Choque funding; the 40-man units
were soon present in more than 600 locations selected according
to the Joint Command campaign plan. Most were COLAR assets,
though a number were run by the Marines, particularly in a special
“minidivisional zone” assigned to the marines, south of navy (ARC)
headquarters in Cartegena on the Caribbean coast.
Local forces had all the more impact, because the police, using the
same approach as the Soldatos de mi Pueblo program, systematically
established presence in every municipio (county) in the country. Those
areas from which they had been driven, or which historically had
been considered too dangerous for police presence, were manned by
what, effectively, was a police ﬁeld force (Carabineros), though under
regular CNP jurisdiction. They functioned in units of the same size
and nature as the COLAR local forces but were more mobile and
often better armed. Where necessary, virtual forts were constructed
to allow secure stations for the projection of state presence. Backing
them up was a highly-trained reaction force.28
Such police involvement as an integral component of the “grid”
highlights a further development: the increasingly joint nature of
Colombian operations. Though answering to a CG Joint Command,
the military services themselves had functioned together more
as a matter of courtesy than command. This had not posed any
insuperable problems, particularly given COLAR’s dominance, but
it was not the ideal way to conduct counterinsurgency, where unity
of command was crucial.29 It was especially the case that the CNP,
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under Pastrana, were not integrated at the national level in any of
the counterinsurgency planning.30 This ended under Uribe.
Within the military itself, a clear trend towards greater “jointness”
that had emerged under Tapias as CG Joint Command, matured
under Mora (during the Uribe administration), and then blossomed
under Ospina. Plans to implement “joint operational commands”
in place of the exclusively COLAR divisional areas were tabled in
Summer 2004―and met with ﬁerce resistance in parochial circles―
but had the support of President Uribe and began to be implemented
in December 2004, when 1st Division became a joint command.
This transformation alone would be enough to produce a
measure of turmoil within the military. Even the existence of the
Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta, which as a joint force is controlled by CG
Joint Command, has generated disquiet in some circles―particularly
as it becomes clear that it is a model of what is to come. If present
plans are pushed through, the individual services will become more
“service providers” in the U.S. sense, while CG Joint Command will
exercise operational control of joint forces that resemble U.S. major
component commands (e.g., Southern Command, or SOUTHCOM,
which supports Colombia’s effort). Such a development is entirely
logical in waging counterinsurgency but is a sea-change in the way
Colombian services have functioned throughout their history.
Such integration extended beyond the military. The involvement
of the state brought a new closeness to working relationships that
hitherto had normally depended upon interpersonal relations in
areas of operation. In particular, law enforcement and judicial
authorities became an important part of operations. This provided
government forces with enhanced ﬂexibility, because the police and
ofﬁcials could engage in actions not legally devolved to the armed
forces (e.g., the right to search).
On a higher plane, a Centro de Coordinacion de Accion Integral
(Coordination Center for Integrated Action, or CCAI31) was formed,
both as a physical entity located on the grounds of the presidential
palace, and as an organizational reality. Its purpose was to coordinate―
to a degree essential in counterinsurgency―the measures necessary
to reincorporate (or incorporate) reclaimed areas into the polity.
Provided with a steadily increasing level of U.S. support, CCAI
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steadily became a more important factor, not only in reclaimed areas
but in the larger functioning of Colombian ministerial affairs.32
Operationally, the guiding document was the Joint Command’s
multiyear Plan Patriota (“Plan Patriot”), which prioritized areas
of insurgent activity (with FARC’s dispositions and activities the
determining factors) and outlined subplans for their neutralization.
This was to be achieved by the classic technique of “holding” in
“strategic maintenance areas”―those where the situation was
already considered in hand―while concentrating forces in “strategic
operational areas.” The ﬁrst of these was Cundinamarca, the state
surrounding Bogota, which throughout 2003 was systematically
cleared of major insurgent presence. The effort was so complete that
FARC assessments outlined a disaster of the ﬁrst magnitude,33 even
as the security forces “moved on” to the area of the former Zona.
“Moved on,” of course, has meant only a concentration of forces
for the purpose of conducting the continuous operations, unlimited
in time but directed at a particular space―“dispersed mass” (masa
dispersa34) in the Joint Command terminology. These are conducted
without fanfare or press releases under tight operational security.
Having cleared Cundinamarca, a joint task force of division strength,
Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta, commanded until recently by Major
General Reinaldo Castellanos Trujillo, has priority of effort and is
systematically combing the former Zona (as well as large areas to the
east) and restoring government presence and popular freedom of
movement and livelihood. A particular chore has been to clear the
numerous mineﬁelds placed in unmarked, widespread fashion by
FARC.35
The overall picture, then, is one of a dramatically improved
security environment. This has seen improvement in other indicators,
the very intent of the Democratic Security and Defence Policy.
CONCLUSIONS: ASSESSING SUSTAINABILITY
What will emerge in the short term is set already by the operational
implementation of President Uribe’s strategic framework. It is
correct, and it is sustainable.36 What will emerge in the long term,
though, depends upon a host of imponderables, not least whether
Uribe gives way to a successor or is allowed a second term.
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That, of course, highlights the third element in counterinsurgency,
little understood. With a correct and sustainable approach in place,
the counterinsurgent “plays for the breaks,” those shifts in the
internal or external situation that work against the insurgent and
favor the state. This normally involves an extended period of time, a
“protracted war.” This makes it difﬁcult for democracies to sustain
counterinsurgent campaigns, particularly in the present worldenvironment where there is little agreement upon strategic ends and
means, much less operational and tactical concerns, but it does not
in any way obviate the reality that there is no other option.37
How, then, to think about the tremendous progress that has
been made, as well as future steps that allow us not only to assess
sustainability of the present effort, but to contribute to its continued
success?
What will drive any assessment will be the nature of the
situation on the ground―as it can be measured. Efforts to do so have
produced a variety of statistics. These have been used to support
both proponents of the present approach’s efﬁcacy and opponents
who question, if not the approach as a whole, certain of its emphases
and components.
Statistics are a double-edged sword. First, there is the political
reality that efforts to arrive at metrics for assessing the progress of
an approach―though absolutely necessary―take on meaning only
as they are interpreted by the audience. All parties to the present
Colombian political debate, for example, agree that there has been
demonstrable progress toward normalcy by any metric utilized,
such as the decline in kidnapping and murder.38 Yet there is little
agreement as to what “normalcy” as an end-state actually should
look like.39 Second, there is the empirical reality that no efforts
have proved successful at “explaining” statistically the causes of
insurgency. Hence, to measure “progress” in moving “back to”
a notional state of “normalcy” is as if we were looking at annual
percentage increases in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) without
actually being able to measure the GDP itself.40 “Progress,” then,
ends up being a state of popular mind, a belief upon the part of the
populace (and its leaders) that the situation is improving.41 That belief
is certainly present in Colombia, as demonstrated by the polling data
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discussed earlier, though there remains an element of the “chattering
classes” that holds the situation, if not precisely worse, is nonetheless
“not acceptable.”42
This preliminary discussion is necessary, because one’s position
on the issues raised has everything to do with how one assesses
current realities and how one would recommend proceeding.
“Sustainability” is not an issue that should engage us further, if the
assessment is that the present approach is not advancing Colombia
towards the desired end-state. This would lead to a recommendation
that Democratic Security, minimally, be modiﬁed; maximally, be
abandoned. As this is not the position of this analysis, it must be made
clear that my assessment rests upon the positive trends outlined but
is neither static nor unqualiﬁed.
In the matter of statistics, it is the combination of quantitative and
qualitative indicators that gives rise to the judgment that progress is
being made. This does not mean, however, that merely advocating
“more of the same” is the prescription for further action so much as
“staying the course.”
Democratic Security has been built upon the acceptance, by the
political authorities of the Uribe administration, of the position
(discussed at length above) that the Gordian knot to Colombia’s
security impasse is FARC. Only FARC continues to seek state power
while simultaneously demonstrating the capacity to negate state armed
capacity. ELN is a nuisance, the AUC historically a consequence of
lack of state presence. Negotiations having been tried unsuccessfully
with FARC, so only armed action remains―even as a simultaneous
negotiating track has been used as the principal weapon to address
AUC, to a lesser extent ELN. The desired goal is reincorporation of
FARC into the political process, but it is recognized that incentive
must be created by armed action.
Compelling FARC to see a course of action necessarily involves
neutralizing its ability as an organization to do what it must do to
retain its viability. Attacking its ability to recruit, sustain itself, move,
and initiate actions is the intent of the “grid” that has been created.
Domination of populated areas, such as Cundinamarca, prepared the
way for the present operations against FARC’s “strategic rearguard”
(FARC’s terminology) in the former Zona. The forces committed to
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each of these and other priority efforts have not been robbed from
the established counterinsurgency areas (effectively, COLAR’s
divisional zones) but deployed from new assets.43 Their actions are
sustainable virtually indeﬁnitely. That their operations indeed have
made life more difﬁcult for FARC is without question. Just “how
difﬁcult?” is the query that cannot be answered deﬁnitively.
The least reliable way to judge results is to match FARC casualties
with the order-of-battle. The top ﬁgure of some 17,000 combatants
(reached during the Pastrana administration) is now put at some
13,000, with most counts claiming that AUC combatants outnumber
their FARC rivals (ELN is such a distant third that consideration
of its numbers does not enter into this discussion). It is not that
these numbers are necessarily wrong, rather that it is unlikely that
they reﬂect the realities of an insurgent movement operating with
a support base. Accuracy in the combatant ﬁgures of the Fighting
Fronts, in other words, likely is not replicated when it comes to
counting the numerous local actors who are certainly the bulk of
the casualties being recorded. Put in terms of FARC’s structure,
then, it seems the case that the companias and other combatant units
(generally associated with various Fighting Fronts) are being fairly
well-assessed. However, it seems also that this becomes increasingly
less the case as one moves further into the local areas from which not
only FARC main force strength, but its logistical support, ultimately
derives.44
Ironically, the need to count numbers is driven not by the
Colombian military, which has made a concerted effort to stay away
from the “Vietnam body count trap.” Instead, it is the need for the
political authorities (many of whom have business backgrounds)
and the press to put forward for the public the numerical equivalent
of sound-bites that has elevated quantitative measures to heights not
found within the military itself. The military approach is clear if one
inspects its internal documents. These give pride of place not to body
count, but instead to insurgent versus government-initiated actions,
ability of FARC to carry out simultaneous actions (ELN does not at
present have this capability), and the largest massing of insurgent
forces carried out.45
Not only are these metrics in sharp contrast to the indicators
favored by the political authorities and the press, they serve to
17

highlight the abuse of statistics that has become a routine part of the
present political debate concerning President Uribe himself. Thus
critics of Uribe and the Democratic Security approach regularly claim
to possess data showing an explosion of incidents and insurgent
initiative,46 a position not backed by realities on the ground. What
ultimately must drive any assessment, as the military has incorporated
into its own analysis, is the nature of the incidents being counted. This
can involve anything from size to context. An insurgent group such
as FARC, forced from mobile warfare back to guerrilla and terror
actions, of necessity needs to up the ante. This FARC attempted to do
through its association with the Provisional Irish Republican Army
(PIRA). Its efforts to utilize a variety of PIRA terror techniques that
hitherto had not been seen in Colombia (or used as exception rather
than rule), ranging from the precise placement of bombs to inﬂict
maximum structural damage, to the use of secondary explosions to
wreak havoc upon response crews to incidents, were all designed
to inﬂict maximum casualties―and generate maximum terror.47 That
they failed left FARC with only the option it has now pursued: pinprick attacks that can produce tactical heat but lack strategic ﬁre.
In only one way could these tactical actions have strategic or
even operational signiﬁcance: if they could be parlayed into political
consequence. The strategic, operational, and even tactical techniques
for using violent action to effect political gain are a central element
of the people’s war approach used by FARC and are recognized
as such in FARC doctrine. They were critical to the effort of the
FMLN―so important to FARC’s own doctrinal evolution―and
were sharpened through direct instruction by the Vietnamese (of
key FMLN personnel) in Vietnam.48 A key issue is whether FARC
is attempting to use its tactical efforts to exploit the rifts within the
Colombian political spectrum. It would appear FARC is well aware
that, by inﬂicting casualties and appearing to be “alive,” despite all
the security forces have done, it can provoke political problems of
sufﬁcient magnitude to damage or even end Democratic Security.49
It is particularly ironic that the strategic progress of Democratic
Security at this point in time will not be able to negate the tactical
ability of FARC to initiate guerrilla and terror actions. The large
number of mine casualties among the security forces, for instance, as
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noted earlier, has little to do with anything save FARC’s extensive use
of the internationally banned weapons systems. Likewise, pushing
ever deeper into previously denied areas can only expose troops still
further to such dangers―even as the dismantling of the counterstate
so laboriously built over the past 40-some years diminishes steadily
FARC’s ability to launch actions of signiﬁcance by ending its ability
to push through serious warmaking supplies to its units.50
Faced with this profound threat to its viability as an insurgent
movement, FARC must respond. As a consequence, there should be
no doubt that “violence” in Colombia will continue indeﬁnitely. Yet
the counter by the state lies in precisely what is being done: creating
a situation where the response is both “correct” and sustainable. The
Uribe approach is certainly “correct” in the manner it conceptualizes
the problem and seeks to respond to it; it is sustainable in its present
form, because it demands no unacceptable investments of resources,
human or material. It will face adjustments if the U.S. contribution
ends, but it is unlikely this will happen for some time.
What has not registered fully on the Colombian political class
is that a correct and sustainable approach is always put in place in
order to “play for the breaks.” In the Philippines, approximately
a half-dozen years were required for the correct approach of
OPLAN Lambat Betag (“Net Trap”) to produce dramatic results; in
Thailand roughly half that ﬁgure after the implementation of Prime
Minister (PM) Order No. 66/23, “The Policy for the Fight to Defeat
the Communists.” Still, if the spectacularly successful Peruvian
approach against Sendero Luminoso took just somewhere in-between
the length of these two campaigns, normalcy in Ulster was achieved
only through a grueling, virtually 25-year effort. And Ulster was but
the size of the small American state of Connecticut, with just half
its population. Patience is as much a part of the equation as a desire
to create precisely the correct mix of techniques that will produce
demonstrable results.
President Uribe was able to deliver the state’s commitment,
strategic framework, and enhanced resources that a meshing of
national and military strategies required. He provided a dynamic
leadership; the Defence Ministry offered further guidance but in
particular engaged in matters of policy which allowed the military
forces to operate. Roles became confused, however, and a desire to
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lead the military rather than manage it led to the replacement of
Minister Ramirez in November 2003 after repeated clashes with the
military leadership. CG Joint Command Jorge Mora also stepped
down.
The Minister and CG were replaced, respectively, by Jorge Alberto
Uribe Echauarria and Carlos Ospina. Moving into CG COLAR position
was the COLAR Director of Operations, MG Martin Orlando Carreno
Sandoval. Mora had planned to step down in December, in any case,
so the transition was smooth. Minister Uribe adopted a more careful
style than his predecessor, and there were no signiﬁcant changes
in the 2004 planning and policy guidance.51 The military was left to
lead the implementation of the counterinsurgency. In this, however,
Carreno did not inspire the support necessary to remain more than
a year in his position. He was replaced in November 2004 by the
Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta commander, Major General Castellanos.52
This is where the situation remains. The military support for the
Democratic Security and Defence Policy has proceeded in near-textbook
fashion. As might be expected, this is not widely understood, with
commentary from alleged “experts” on counterinsurgency often wide
of the mark.53 Politically, the danger is that Colombia will become
distracted, as already evidenced in the debate that has surfaced
surrounding Uribe’s plans to run for a second term. To oppose a
second term for Uribe all but demands that his ﬁrst term record be
attacked. This debate has not involved direct assaults on the security
forces but on their approach, as well as claiming “social matters are
as important as security.”54 That one is not possible without the other
would seem to be precisely the point of the Uribe approach.55
Nevertheless, the growing debate over a second term does serve
to highlight two issues that emerge time and again in the assessment
of any counterinsurgency.
Leadership Matters.
Uribe has proved the right man, at the right time, as have ﬁgures
in other places, in other times―one thinks of Magsaysay in the
Philippines or Templar in Malaya.56 By extension, 4 years, in fact,
is not an adequate period of time within which to see through a
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counterinsurgency. Any number of pros and cons can be advanced
concerning a “second term.” These are not for consideration here―a
persuasive case can be made on either side of the question. What
does seem obvious is that likely successors will have been presented
with a model of skillful, dynamic leadership.
Such might also be said of the substantial advances made to
date. “Have they been institutionalized? Can they be sustained?” is
the most common way of posing the purported conundrum. This
seems to miss the point. Institutionalization is as much a function of
individuals as structure and procedures. Considered in this light, all
“systems,” to include militaries, are inadequate to a degree. Mora/
Ospina, for instance, sought to institutionalize their changes through
myriad ways, from regulations concerning uniform wear to fostering
a new ethos within the ofﬁcer corps. President Uribe has sought to
institutionalize his own reforms through a similar methodology,
from demanding accountability and transparency to standing up new
structures, such as CCAI. In terms of sustainability, distribution of
resources is well within the ranges Colombia is capable of delivering
for any short-term or even longer-term projection.57
As concerns the military speciﬁcally, the commentary above is
not intended to underestimate the extent of the challenges facing
the military (but mainly COLAR) as a result of its expansion and
increased operational tempo (“ops tempo”). COLAR was previously
a draftee force of “in and out” enlisted ranks, led by a professional
ofﬁcer corps. It now is one-third volunteer. These individuals expect
to make the military a career. A host of issues, from family welfare
to promotion requirements to NCO rank, must be codiﬁed and then
allowed to mature. Adding to the challenge is the very nature of
continuous small unit operations conducted so as to give FARC
no time to recover.58 Everything from “block leave” procedures to
family counseling (e.g., to cope with a rising level of internal turmoil
within families in a force that historically has had relatively few
disciplinary problems) has had to be instituted. Topping all this is
the ever-present threat of corruption in an environment saturated
with the easy money of the narcotics trade.
In the ﬁeld, the strategic initiative has inevitably, as is to be
expected, also featured tactical setbacks. The insurgents, after all,
also have a learning curve and have sought to exploit the very
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weaknesses created by the government’s success and a zero-defects
political mentality. As military action has forced the insurgents to
break up into small units, the security forces have done likewise. This,
however, creates opportunities for medium-size concentrations to
surprise isolated or tactically sloppy units with rapid concentrations
which then disperse. The technique is not new, but the latest actions
have seen FARC grappling for a middle ground between “large” and
“small” concentrations, thus to be able to attack platoon- or squadsize positions (large columnas in the Samper/early Pastrana years
would attack even reinforced companies). The insurgents appear to
recognize the pressure for “no bad news” placed upon the military
by the political structure59 and thus have moved adroitly to exploit
it.60
Of course, the favorable strategic situation, it has been argued,
could be undone in a ﬂash by follow-on personalities. Is this likely?
No, because of all that has been discussed above. In particular,
both the reforms and the demands of internal war have produced
an accelerating change in the composition of military (particularly
COLAR) leadership. Warﬁghters, who would be as comfortable in
the U.S. Army as their own, have begun to dominate promotion
boards, with “service in the ﬁeld” as the salient factor in selection.
This is a critical element, since the military is the shield for all else
that occurs in the counterinsurgency.
As combat-tested ofﬁcers have begun to dominate,61 the question
emerges as to what sort of men they are (there are no female general
ofﬁcers in Colombia). In terms of the institution they have made,
the results falsify the constant drumbeat of lax standards and abuses
that often is rattled off by outsiders, especially international human
rights organizations. To the contrary, the military has in the Mora/
Ospina years consistently emerged in Colombian polls as one of the
most respected institutions in the country, with numbers reaching
80 percent. In terms of individuals, the reforms have endeavored
to demand more from them in professional terms, particularly in
terms of warﬁghting, both mechanics and theory. This has resulted
in greater knowledge at the strategic and operational levels of war,
as well as increased tactical expertise.62
Put together, military popularity and effectiveness undoubtedly
have contributed to President Uribe’s own consistently high
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rating with the public. Uribe himself deals with the military in an
increasingly sophisticated manner and has grown to respect the
professional judgment, ﬁrst of Mora, then of Ospina. This was in a
sense predictable. Unlike the situations in many counterinsurgencies,
where a dynamic leader summoned to the helm must reshape both
approach and instruments of implementation, Colombia by August
2002 had a military with a correct, tested approach that desperately
needed competent, aggressive, strategically astute leadership. This
President Uribe provided.63
Strategic Approach is Critical.
Indeed, as indicated throughout this discussion, strategic
approach, with its operational (campaign) implementation, must be
the foremost concern of leadership in a counterinsurgency. To this
end, Uribe was fortunate to have ofﬁcers of the caliber of Mora and
Ospina. If Mora may be identiﬁed as having seen COLAR through
its early transformation, Ospina has had not only to ﬁnish the job
but implement the central operations of Plan Patriota. He has had
to do this even while resources have remained constrained, and
demands have risen for greater emphasis upon the “development”
side of Uribe’s plan. It is not enough, say critics, to regain control of
the population; areas seized and held must be consolidated. As the
military is keenly aware of the point at issue―and has U.S.-supported
programs designed to address this dimension of the conﬂict64―the
real questions revolve around allocation of resources and timing.
Here, Uribe has stood his ground, remaining true to the spirit of his
Democratic Security and Defence Policy―security is the necessary basis
for all that follows.
It is precisely the substantial progress made in restoring a
semblance of “normal life” that has allowed internal debate over
issues such as the displaced―several million Colombians have had
to ﬂee areas of conﬂict over the course of the war―and trends in
civil-military relations. The latter is often overlooked in judging the
effectiveness of military leaders; but here, too, Colombia has been
well-served.
Ospina, in particular, has sought to implement a very “American”
vision of the military’s relationship to civil authority. As with the
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emphasis upon combat as the key determinant for promotion, the
reinforcement of civilian authority’s position as the ﬁnal word in
matters of moment has not sat well with some military elements.
It was, at least in part, Uribe’s understanding that healthy civilmilitary relations depended upon an invisible line’s not being
crossed (where military core prerogatives were concerned) that led
to the replacement of Marta Lucia Ramirez as Defence Minister by
Jorge Alberto Uribe. Once having been given its strategic marching
orders by civilian authority, the military has maintained ﬁrmly its
right to determine operational and tactical particulars.65
Still, as the present dominant military ﬁgure, Ospina has
demonstrated an astute understanding of an elected president’s
needs, just as Uribe has of the military’s strengths in facilitating
his campaign to redeem Colombia. Even while focusing upon the
military domination of local areas and the pursuit of FARC into its
base areas, Ospina has sought to deliver “progress” in whatever form
necessary to Uribe’s viability as wartime leader.66 This has meant
added emphasis upon not only civic action (accion integral) but also
upon nurturing local government back to health in reclaimed areas. 67
In the larger sense, Uribe’s national policy has always stood
upon three legs, not merely security but also ﬁscal health and social
development. The former is necessary for all else to proceed and has
given no grounds for complaint. The latter remains at the heart of all
illegal actors’ ability to recruit manpower. It, too, has been addressed
as dictated by the progress in the other two sides of the triangle. That
one would wish greater emphasis or speed is a judgment call that
ﬂies in the face of demonstrable progress.
RECOMMENDATIONS
If it cannot be judged that the Democratic Security approach
requires major adjustments, there are areas which bear close
monitoring as concern the military/strategic support for the plan.
• Ongoing efforts of the Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta in the former
Zona (and to the east) should be constantly assessed to validate
their continued achievement of desired end: the degradation
of FARC’s ability to launch signiﬁcant action. This will require
careful analysis of FARC’s funding and supply proﬁles, as
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well as precise determination of how its local presence relates
to the larger movement and to the “strategic rearguard.” A
moment may well be near when the next phase of Plan Patriota
should be initiated, because continued priority of effort to the
Joint Task Force is a matter of diminishing returns.
• Analysis must continue to assess more accurately FARC’s
funding proﬁle and to determine the impact of counternarcotics
efforts upon the warﬁghting capacity of the movement.
Integration of the counternarcotics effort within the larger
counterinsurgency must be a matter of ongoing focus, with
metrics keyed as much to Colombia’s counterinsurgency
needs as to the need to ﬁght drugs.
• Greater coordination and cooperation with neighboring states
should be given a high priority in an effort to enlist their
resources and forces in the common effort to prevent the use
of frontiers for illicit activity. Of particular concern should be
the movement of insurgent bases into relative sanctuaries in
neighboring states and the continued use of mobility corridors
that originate in those same neighboring states. Necessarily,
military representatives will be an important part of such
activity.
• Within Colombia, the key to the domination of local space
remains the viability of the “peasant soldiers” program.
No effort should be spared to continue its expansion and
enhancement. Those who have served their time should be
mobilized into a second-tier national guard framework that
can continue to utilize the skills and motivation developed in
ﬁrst-tier active service.
• Further enhancement of the “grid” can be gained through
completing the transition of divisional to joint commands,
and the continuing integration of police and civil elements
into planning and operations. It is particularly important to
continue the developing relationship between the military
and the police.
• Greater resources should be put into the consolidation effort
represented by CCAI. The reincorporation of alienated
localities is the ultimate test of success in the counterinsurgency.
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A complementary effort is assessment of the nature of local
realities after normalcy is restored. Neutralization of FARC
(or ELN) must be accompanied by the writ of the state and
not by the revitalization of AUC presence.
• A more robust information warfare campaign should be
waged. Successes need to be utilized to a much greater
extent to demonstrate the progress that has been made and
to foster the continued legitimacy accorded the state by the
population.
• The maturation of the “grid,” as the ﬁelding of new units is
completed, should be looked upon as an opportunity to codify
techniques and successes in revised doctrine. This can inform
training and schooling in such manner as to institutionalize
the advances made.
• Efforts should be focused upon resolving contradictions in
military personnel policies and logistical procedures which
have retarded maturation of the forces and the war effort.
Similarly, there are areas where the U.S. component of the
campaign needs to be monitored.
• The battle is not over. U.S. support, in material and personnel,
will play an important role for the foreseeable future. These
must be maintained. To the contrary, a tendency has emerged
in U.S. circles that seeks to interpret realities on the ground in
terms that speak to the artiﬁcial deadlines created by funding
legislation. This is extraordinarily dangerous, particularly the
notion that the war is won, and it is time to talk of running
down U.S. aid and converting Colombian forces to other uses
(such as United Nations peacekeeping).
• Hand-in-hand with this misjudgment is analysis that persists
in viewing the struggle through an incorrect lens. This has
been especially visible in some U.S. political and media
circles, where the conﬂict is yet labeled as either CN or CT or
something else. It is all of these things and must be approached
in a uniﬁed manner. This is precisely what the Colombians
have been ﬁghting to achieve, and they have made dramatic
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strides. These have come at considerable political and personal
cost for key players such as President Uribe, Minister Uribe,
and CG Joint Command Ospina.
• This drive towards unity of effort must extend to the U.S.
side. Greater effort is necessary to raise the level of awareness
in Washington that what happens in Colombia is the
lynchpin of our Latin American position. This is not a new
domino theory so much as a recognition that, in the present
strategic environment, Latin America is the forgotten theatre;
SOUTHCOM, the forgotten command; and Colombia, our
forgotten but closest, most reliable ally. At a time when the
forces of the radical left are again on the march throughout the
Hemisphere, to include advocating a severely restricted ﬁght
against drugs, Colombia has emerged as having interests most
coincident with the United States. More than that, it remains
a stable democratic state committed to reform and the market
economy. The contrast with an increasingly unstable and
strategically dangerous Venezuela could not be greater.
• Operationally, recognition of the points above should take
the form of an enhanced relationship between U.S. and
Colombian forces, as well as between the strategic cultures of
the two countries. Military cooperation could be enhanced in
myriad ways, in particular by augmenting training programs
so that they reﬂect more accurately the nature of the close
relations between Washington and Bogota. Simultaneously,
closer relations should be facilitated between U.S. centers of
strategic, risk assessment, and regional analysis and those in
Colombia. The latter have a level of expertise and analytical
capability surpassing any in Latin America but have been
underutilized. They could make a greater contribution to
Democratic Security, as well as the larger Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT).
• There are areas one could further highlight, such as the desire
for even greater force strengths or mobility assets. Yet these
must be carefully balanced against available resources and
the ability of the system itself to absorb any more inputs.
Burnishing what has come to exist in the nearly 3 years of
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the Uribe administration might well pay greater gains than
seeking to load any more onto the system.
What bears repeating is the point to which this analysis has
returned often: the present effort is both correct and sustainable. It
is the strategic posture required for progress and popular security.
Hence continued care must be exercised to ensure that Democratic
Security remains a multifaceted approach, a strengthening of the
state―of its governance and ﬁnances―and of democratic capacity.
These are carried out behind the ever more powerful and capable
shield provided by the security forces. But they only enable the
solution, which lies in the use of legitimacy to mobilize response
against those using political violence to seek illegitimate ends.
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and state that “the war” is quite a safe place to be compared to, say, the normal,
criminally-affected environment of Medellin! The point is that society must decide
what it “can live with.” Perhaps the ultimate illustration might be provided by “The
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Justice/University of Illinois at Chicago, 1995, pp. 53-96.
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not enumerated in the American order of battle, because it was felt the ﬁgures leaned
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An Intelligence Memoir, South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 1995. The post-war
legal action began when television network CBS charged in a documentary (that
featured prominently Sam Adams) that the military authorities, rather than being
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mislead their political masters. General William Westmoreland, commander during
the period in question, pursued legal action that, among other things, generated
considerable useful data of relevance to our discussion of the Colombian case. See,
e.g., Bob Brewin and Sydney Shaw, Vietnam on Trial: Westmoreland vs. CBS, NY:
Atheneum, 1987; Don Kowet, A Matter of Honor: General William C. Westmoreland
Versus CBS, New York: Macmillan, 1984. Adams, though remaining a “must read”
in any Vietnam bibliography, has been debunked effectively on both matters of
military motive and order of battle particulars. See James J. Wirtz, “Intelligence to
Please? The Order of Battle Controversy During the Vietnam War,” Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. 106, Summer 1991, pp. 239-263, reprinted in Wirtz and James K.
Johnson, Strategic Intelligence, Los Angeles: Roxbury, 2004, pp. 183-197.
45. See, e.g., General Carlos Alberto Ospina Ovalle, Politica de Seguridad
Democratica y la Situacion en Colombia, Power Point brieﬁng, undated but delivered
publicly in both Colombia and the United States during the past year. FARC
increasingly has been driven to small unit action.
46. See, e.g., the discusion contained in Angel Romero, “Abandono en fronteras
facilita ingreso de armas,” La Opinión Online, April 7, 2005, at www.laopinion.com.co.
47. For quick reference on PIRA relationship with FARC, see Jeremy McDermott,
“‘IRA Inﬂuence’ in FARC Attacks,” BBC, May 9, 2005.
48. Former FMLN personnel who were trained in Vietnam and have worked with
the Colombian security forces have noted that prior to any “technical” instruction,
i.e., military methods, they were required to attend courses on the use of military
action to accomplish political goals. The use of violence to facilitate Hanoi’s position
in the Paris “peace talks” was the central case story. Field notes, March-April 2004.
49. My analysis here jibes with that of Dave Spencer―i.e., that FARC, as judged
by data contained in interrogation reports and in captured documents, understands
what it is doing and has displayed considerable astuteness in exploiting the
present Colombian political debate. The intensity of the debate is well-publicized
and is understood by FARC through reports relayed by its urban operatives. My
assessment, however, is not shared by all observers of the Colombian scene.
50. A common misconception is that “guerrillas” are self-sustaining, obtaining
all they need either by generating it or capturing it from the government. In reality,
insurgents can rarely, if ever, obtain crucial components of their war effort, notably
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arms and ammunition, from within the battle space and thus must seek acquisition
outside. FARC gains most of its weapons and ammunition from abroad. Even food,
as demonstrated by massive caches uncovered in the former Zona throughout 2004
and now 2005, is stockpiled and pushed forward to combatants. Field notes, February
2005.
51. See Comandante General Fuerzas Militares, Carlos Alberto Ospina Ovalle,
Direccionamiento Estrategico y Politicas de Comando 2004, Bogota: Joint Command,
undated; and Comandante Ejercito Nacional, Martin Orlando Carreno Sandoval,
Direccionamiento y Politicas de Comando 2004, Bogota: COLAR, undated; both in
Spanish only.
52. In early 2005, a further four senior COLAR ofﬁcers were separated from
service for continuing to resist the joint command concept and engaging in other
actions deemed inappropriate by the Minister of Defense and CG Joint Command.
53. See, e.g., the commentary within Rachel Van Dongen, “Plan Puts Colombia
on Offensive,” Christian Science Monitor, June 22, 2004, internet. Western periodicalsof-record continue to be inadequate in their treatment of the counterinsurgency,
displaying little understanding of either the security forces or their operations.
54. A useful discussion of the topic, albeit one that appears to underestimate the
security dimension of the issue it discusses, is Michael Shifter and Vinay Jawahar,
“State Building in Colombia: Getting Priorities Straight,” Journal of International
Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, Fall 2004, pp. 143-154.
55. Hence the title of the ﬁrst chapter, “Order, the First Need of All,” in the
famous work by Russell Kirk, The Roots of American Order, Washington, DC: Regnery
Gateway, 1991.
56. For an overview, see Franklin Mark Osanaka, ed., Modern Guerrilla Warfare:
Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961, New York: Free Press, 1962.
57. Analyst Dave Spencer, of Hicks & Associates, widely known for his superior
commentary on Colombia, has noted:
Colombians could dig much deeper if they wanted to, but “if they wanted
to” is the key. They haven’t really been forced to do so thus far. There are
elements in the population who want to ﬁght a war and be comfortable at
the same time, similar to the U.S. during Vietnam. The Colombians should
be leery of being victims of their own success. They uniﬁed to elect Uribe
and to kick off the Democratic Security program. Now that the war has
returned to the pre-Serpa/Pastrana levels, they want to haggle and ﬁght
with each other. They―not the FARC―are their own worst enemy.
Personal communication, February 9, 2005.
58. The actual nature of COLAR ground operations is fairly consistently
misrepresented in the Colombian press, particularly the claim that “big units”
are engaging in aimless “search and destroy” in circumstances more appropriate
to “small units.” Of necessity, “units” deploy as per their identity―there are, for
instance, half a dozen BRIM presently active in the former Zona, and areas to the
east. Yet their deployment particulars are driven by the anticipated ability of the
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insurgents to mass. What is critical, in areas where the insurgents have a capacity to
appear in substantial numbers, is for subordinate units to remain within reinforcing
distance of one another. As the threat posture changes, greater distances between
units are allowed, thus breaking up into numerous smaller “patrols.” For further
discusión of the situation, see Zachariah Bruyn Decker, “Las Farc en los tiempos de
Uribe,” El Espectador, October 10, 2004, p. 1.
59. This problem predates President Uribe and revolves around the concept
of “omission,” similar to the concept in the United States that emergency services
may be found negligent for failing to respond in a reasonable and timely manner
to emergencies. In Colombia, the legal system was used by activists to generate the
requirement that all instances of “threat” be acted upon―with extensive documentation
required to make a case for doing otherwise. The result was an untenable situation
in which the tactical initiative was ceded to rumor and insurgent exploitation of the
mechanism. False calls led to ambush, but to use military sense to sort out reality
from fancy risked the end of a career. The same dynamic, unfortunately, has been
created by the present administration’s “zero defects” approach to the conﬂict. As a
result, ill-considered responses often are seen as preferable to rebuke, with tactical
miscues leading to unnecessary casualties. In turn, tactical setbacks have resulted in
command-reliefs, through presidential intercession, in circumstances that can only
be deemed questionable.
60. As February-May 2005 unfolded, FARC clearly was engaged in an offensive
designed to inﬂict maximum casualties, thus exploiting both the zero-defects
mentality of the administration and the tendency of at least a proportion of the
Colombian “chattering classes” to view the normal give-and-take of tactical action as
a sign of larger strategic defect. In reality, the small, hard-to-prevent tactical successes
have meant nothing to the strategic situation―but could have a strategic impact by
manipulating perception and spurring further the debate as to “sustainability.”
61. Results of promotion boards and attendance at key schools are revealing in
this respect. The 130 COLAR Majors who attended the 2003 staff school, for instance,
included 29 percent (38) who had already commanded BCG; 50 percent of the class
had been decorated for valor―with 20 percent (26) of the entire class having received
multiple awards. Selection for middle and upper level COLAR service schools
remains tied to advancement. Lest the point be missed: nearly a third of a staff course
already, as majors, had commanded light infantry battalions in combat and been
extensively decorated. They graduated to ﬁll staff positions (most desired, those
in the 12 x BRIM) and take command of regular battalions. Since BCG command
is “branch immaterial,” the driving force of COLAR is being systematically tested,
evaluated, and promoted through combat.
62. Important in this effort has been a continuing series of command seminars and
special courses ordered by Ospina, ﬁrst as CG COLAR, then as CG Joint Command.
These have principally focused upon upgrading the overall knowledge of military
theory and art, but they have also included “combat refresher” courses for all ranks
from lieutenant colonel up.
63. Thus Colombia faced the opposite dilemma of Abraham Lincoln during the
American Civil War, wherein he went through any number of commanders before
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ﬁnding in Ulysses S. Grant, the man―“he ﬁghts.” Colombia’s military, having
restored its ability to ﬁght, needed a president who did likewise. For exact wording
and context of Abraham Lincoln’s famous observation concerning Grant, see James
M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, New York: Ballantine Books,
1988, pp. 414-415. For discussion of the profound challenges and evolution in Civil
War civil-military relations, see Joseph T. Glatthaar, Partners in Command, New York:
The Free Press, 1994; and T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, New York:
Gramercy Books, 2000. Lest such comparison be regarded as strained, recourse
need only be had to surveying the normally inadequate initial military response to
insurgencies since the end of World War II. Invariably, whether one considers so basic
a step as arming citizens desperate to defend themselves, or framing strategic and
operational response to the insurgents, militaries generally have been slow to ﬁnd
their counterinsurgent stride and often have required external stimulus provided by
new political leadership.
64. Current operations of the Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta, for instance, have received
growing input in U.S. civic action support for a variety of projects from infrastructure
development, to medical assistance, to bringing or restoring judicial services to
isolated communities. Of greatest moment is that the projects are implemented
by joint military/civilian efforts, designed to facilitate implementation of more
permanent arrangements, and often embedded in far-reaching micro-development
initiatives, such as pursuing alternative crops from a “systems” perspective,
production to market. Field notes, September 2004.
65. That COLAR, in particular, is in a period of transition from its “German”
heritage (transmitted historically through Chilean vectors) to an “American” model
has been stated directly in brieﬁngs to ofﬁcers. (The air force [FAC] has long looked to
America for inspiration, the navy [ARC] to the British.) This has not meant, however,
the uncritical adoption of either U.S. forms or procedures. American difﬁculties in
Iraq, stemming at least in part from the intervention of civilian leadership in military
operational efforts, have been a poignant reminder that a balance must be struck
between obedience to civilian authority and institutional independence. What this
balance should be remains indeterminate.
66. Indispensable for a general treatment of this subject―“an elected president’s
needs in wartime”―is Herman Hattaway and J. Archer Jones, How the North Won: A
Military History of the Civil War, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991.
67. Frequently referred to as “back-ﬁlling” in counterinsurgency parlance,
this restoration of legitimate government writ is often the most difﬁcult aspect
counterinsurgency. It requires a coordination of manpower and resources that is
difﬁcult to achieve even in peacetime, much less time of strife. It also is inherently
costly. In Colombia, the effort is greatly complicated by the large number of displaced
persons who desperately need assistance.
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